BEFORE THE POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF CAM INDUSTRIES, INC.) }	
Appellant,	рснв_No., 86-32 .	
v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY,) ORDER GRANTING) APPELLANT'S MOTION) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMEN)	ΙT
Respondent.))	

THIS MATTER, the appeal of a hazardous waste generator's fee assessment, came on for hearing on the parties cross motions for summary judgment, on May 5, 1986 in Lacey, Washington. Sitting as the Board were Wick Dufford (presiding), Lawrence J. Faulk and Gayle Rothrock. Without objection, testimony at that time was heard from appellant's vice-president for finance. David Tarshes, Attorney-at-Law, represented CAM Industries, Inc.; Jeffrey Goltz, Assistant Attorney General, represented the Department of Ecology.

The Board has considered the testimony and oral argument and the

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

2

. 3

14

5

16

7

18

9

0

1

٦2

3

24

5

?6

- 1.) Memorandum of Respondent Department of Ecology in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
 - 2.) Affidavit of Karen Michelena, with five exhibits attached:
 - a) Exhibit 1 Generator Annual Dangerous Waste Report, CAM Industries, 2/27/85
 - b) Exhibit 2 Hazardous Waste Generator Assessment, Annual 1984, CAM Industries
 - c) Exhibit 3 Request for Waiver of Fee, CAM Industries
 - d) Exhibit 4 Letter, Revenue to Ecology, dated July 5, 1985
 - e) Exhibit 5 Letter, Ecology to CAM Industries, January 24, 1986, attaching Hazardous Waste Generator Assessment, Annual 1984, Cam Industries, reassessment billing.
- 3.) Memorandum of appellant CAM Industries, Inc. in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
 - 4.) Affidavit of N.W. Van, with three exhibits attached:
 - a) Exhibit A Hazardous Waste Generator Assessment, Annual 1984, CAM Industries, reassessment billing
 - b) Letter, CAM Industries to Ecology, dated February 19, 1985
 - c) Exhibit C Combined Excise Tax Retruns, CAM Industries, 1984 (12 monthly returns)
- 5.) Memorandum of Department of Ecology in Response to Appeliant CAM Industries' Motion for Summary Judgment.

FACTS

On the record and presentations made, the Board finds no material facts to be in dispute. The following are undisputed:

- 1.) CAM Industries engages in Washington and in other states in the business of manufacturing and selling fabricated steel items, including electrical, pneumatic, hydraulic and plumbing components.
- 2.) CAM is a generator of hazardous wastes in the state subject to an annual fee assessed by the Department of Ecology, but collected

ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

2

5

6

7

8

10 8

11 12

- 3

ı **4**

15

16 17

18 19

> '0 '1

²2

4

25

26 27 3.) On April 30, 1985, Ecology assessed CAM a fee of \$6,750 for the generation of hazardous waste for calendar year 1984. The assessment placed CAM in risk class G-5, and relied on a figure for CAM's annual gross income of more than \$10 million provided by the Department of Revenue.

- 4.) On June 14, 1985, CAM filed with Ecology a Request for Waiver of Fee, on a form provided by Ecology. The returned form showed a check alongside the following pre-printed entry as the basis for the waiver request: "The annual gross income (AGI) shown on my fee statement is incorrect."
- 5.) Ecology contacted Revenue to confirm CAM's 1984 annual gross income. Revenue responded with a figure matching that initially used to compute CAM's fee.
- 6.) On January 24, 1986, Ecology denied CAM's Request for Waiver of Fee, and forwarded to CAM a "reassessment billing" identical in fee to its initial assessment but setting forth new due dates.
- 7.) The annual gross income figure on which Ecology based its fee for 1984 included CAM's income from activities outside the State of Washington as well as within the state.
- 8.) CAM's 1984 gross income attributable to the company's activities within the State of Washington only was approximately \$9.3 million.

ISSUES

CAM argues that the fee imposed on a generator under RCW ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT'S

3

4

5 6

7 8

ŧ 0

9

11 12

3

14

· 5

16 17

_8

9

٦1

'2 3

4

'5 '6

27

75.105A.030 must be based on the annual gross income attributable to the business's activities within the state of Washington.

Ecology contends: 1) that this Board should decline to entertain the issue CAM raises, and somehow, provide for it to be answered by the Department of Revenue; 2) that Chapter 70.105A RCW does not limit annual gross income for the purposes of the fee in question to income attributable to a business's in-state activities.

DISCUSSION

The statutory generator's fee under consideration is the product of two basic considerations: 1) annual gross income and 2) the risk involved for the hazardous wastes generated. RCW 70.105A.030(2) provides for graduating the fee by reference to annual gross income as follows:

- (a) For annual gross income not in excess of one million dollars, a fee of not more than one hundred fifty dollars;
- (b) For annual gross income in excess of one million dollars but not exceeding ten million dollars, a fee of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars;
- (c) For annual gross income in excess of ten million dollars, a fee of not more than seven thousand five hundred dollars.

The same statutory subsection directs Ecology to further graduate the fee through a fee schedule adopted as a regulation which incorporates criteria relating to the quantity of hazardous waste generated and the health and environmental risks associated with the waste.

Ecology has complied with this directive in chapter 173-305 WAC. Seven risk classes are established in ascending order of riskiness.

ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PCHB No. 86-32

1 WAC 173-305-030(3)(b). The fee schedule itself is set forth in a 2 matrix appearing under WAC 173-305-040(1)(a).

3	\$1,000,000.01				
_	Risk	\$1,000,000.00		to	more than
4	Class	and less	\$	10,000,000	\$10,000,000.00
5	G1	\$15.00		\$100.00	\$1,000.00
_	G2	\$40.00		\$300.00	\$3,000.00
6	l G3	\$65.00		\$500.00	\$5,000.00
-	G4	\$90.00		\$600.00	\$6,000.00
7	G5	\$115.00		\$675.00	\$6,750.00
	G6	\$140.00		\$725.00	\$7,250.00
8	G7	\$150.00		\$750.00	\$7,500.00

The significance of whether CAM's AGI for fee purposes is to be taken from total income or only from income attributable to its activities in Washington is obvious. If the former, the fee is \$6,750. If the latter, it is \$675.

In approaching this case, the Board is mindful that the Department of Revenue and the Board of Tax Appeals are the sources to look to for expertise in tax matters. We do not, however, regard resolution of this controversy over fee setting as a matter requiring that kind of expertise.

The substantive issue is essentially an ordinary question of statutory construction. We are not concerned with whether any particular of CAM's tax return is accurate or properly included within the category where it belongs. The question is simply which of two uncontested sums should be used as the basis for AGI, as that term is used in chapter 70.105A RCW.

We are emboldened in tackling this issue by the knowledge that Ecology, itself an entity without obvious expertise in taxation, has

9

10

11

12

13

4

15

16

٠7

18

19

0°

1.

22

_'3

24

25

.:6

ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PCHB No. 86-32

seen fit to interpret the statute on the very point it asks us to duck. Indeed, our conclusion rests, in substantial part, on our deference to the interpretation of the statute which Ecology has made.

1. AGI for purposes of the generator's fee should be based on AGI attributable to the entity's business in the state.

The statute first defines AGI without reference to any geographic limitation. RCW 70.105A.020(8) But the section establishing the generator's fee adds to the definition, and in so doing suggests the in-state limitation on AGI for which CAM argues. RCW 70.105A.030(3), provides that the AGI of businesses taxable under RCW 82.04.290 "and maintaining places of business within and without this state" shall be apportioned pursuant to RCW 82.04.460. The latter section states that tax liability for such businesses shall be derived by apportioning "to this state that portion of [its] gross income which is derived from services rendered within this state."

The language of RCW 70.105A.030(3) again seems to contemplate an in-state activities restriction on AGI where it speaks to apportioning the hazardous waste fee among several sites a business may maintain within Washington state. The overall AGI number to be used in dividing the fee among specific sites is "[t]he total annual gross income of the business taxable in this state under chapters 82.04 and 82.16 RCW." Chapter 82.04 is Washington's Business and Occupation tax which is limited in scope by the scope of business activities in this state. See RCW 82.04.4286; Department of Revenue v. J.C. Penney Co., 96 Wn.2d 38, 633 P.2d 870(1981).

ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PCHB No. 86-32

.0

. 1

. 7

• 9

.0

'2

An agency's regulations must "fill in the gaps" where necessary to the effectuation of a general statutory scheme. Hama Hama Company v. Shorelines Hearings Board, 85 Wn.2d 441, 536 P.2d 157(1975). Ecology has done this in its implementing regulation. WAC 173-305-010 states that it is Ecology which assesses the fees provided for in chapter 70.105A RCW. As to generator fees this is accomplished by first asking Revenue to provide an AGI number. Under WAC 173-305-030(2)(a):

The AGI obtained from the department of revenue for persons whose business activities earn income without as well as within the state will reflect the portion of total AGI attributable to activities within the state. (emphasis added)

To us this appears a clear and unambiguous interpretation, reasonably consistent with the statute being implemented. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Department of Ecology, 86 Wn. 2d 310, 545 P.2d 5 (1976).

Later on in WAC 173-305-030(2)(b)(ii) where Ecology includes a formula for apportioning the fee among multiple in-state sites of a business, the overall AGI figure used is supposed to equal "total AGI attributable to the person's business in this state." Again Ecology has clearly chosen an in-state activities limitation. Such regulatory provisions, the product of Ecology's own reading of the statute, are presumed to be valid and are entitled to considerable deference.

Kaiser Aluminum v. Department of Ecology, 32 Wn. App. 399, 647 P.2d 551 (1982).

Naturally, Ecology does not here directly attack its own regulations. Faced with the inconvenience of their explicit language, the agency argues that it is powerless to look behind the AGI figure

ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PCHB No. 86-32

it is given by Revenue. Nothing in the statute or the rules supports this assertion of powerlessness.

The statute simply provides that Revenue will collect the fee. In so doing it is empowered to use some of the collection mechanisims of chapter 82.32 RCW. In addition, it is empowered to adjust the fee "if the annual gross income of the business . . . is finally determined to be greater or less than that reported to the department of revenue for the year in question." RCW 70.105A.030(9). Here we do not deal with any change in what was reported to Revenue. We have no problem with the numbers CAM provided. We deal rather with the basic question of where, within information already reported, the label AGI is to be affixed for the purposes of the statute. The statute gives Revenue no role in this regard.

Furthermore, Ecology's regulations do not tie its own nands concerning the AGI figure provided by Revenue. The section on coordination between Ecology and Revenue merely states that "figures on annual gross income for businesses will be obtained from revenue." WAC 173-305-050(3). It does not say that Ecology must abide by whatever definition of AGI Revenue has chosen <u>sub silentio</u> to use in responding to Ecology's request.

Ecology has an affirmative duty to abide by its own regulations.

Ritter v. Hospital Commissioners, 96 Wn. 2d 503 (1981). Here where
these regulations specify that Revenue is to provide an AGI figure
which reflects "the portion of total AGI attributable to activities
within the state," Ecology cannot take refuge in the notion that it

· 3

: 4

<u>:</u> 7

'1

¹⁾5

6ء

ൗ7

ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PCHB No. 86-32

2.

'2

<u>.</u>!5

has no choice but to accept whatever Revenue tells it. Ecology has an obligation to insure that Revenue provides it with a number for AGI which is consistent with the rules Ecology has adopted.

In short, we conclude that AGI for the purposes of the generator's fee should be based on AGI attributable to the entity's business in the state. We reach this result because we are persuaded that Ecology's interpretation of the statute as expressed in its regulations, is consistent with the underlying legislation.

This Board has the authority to decide this case.

RCW 70.105A.070 provides:

Any person aggrieved by a determination of the department of ecology pertaining to the fee imposed under RCW 70.105A.030(1) . . . may obtain review thereof by the pollution control hearings board . . . (emphasis added)

This section provides the only means for reviewing fee determinations explicitly provided in the statute. We believe, under the facts at hand, that it confers jurisdiction on this Board to entertain the issue raised.

This is a case about a fee which, by virtue of Ecology's regulations, that agency is purporting to have assessed. The issue was initially raised by a Request for Waiver of Fee filed with Ecology on a form provided by Ecology, containing as a pre-printed ground for challenge the assertion that the AGI on the fee statement is incorrect.

What the case comes down to is whether the AGI which was the basis for the fee is consistent with the use of that term under Ecology's regulations. The AGI figure provided by Revenue included out-of-state

1 as well as in-state activities. There is no factual issue about determinations. .2 .3 · 7 າ2 .'5 ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PCHB No. 86-32

this. Accordingly, we conclude that Ecology's acceptance of that figure represented "a determination of the department of ecology pertaining to the fee imposed." We have jurisdiction to review such

ORDER

On the basis of the foregoing, the Board renders judgment in favor of appellant CAM Industries, Inc., reverses the denial of the request for waiver, and remands the matter to the Department of Ecology for recomputation and reassessment of the fee in a manner consistent with this Order.

DONE this 21th of June, 1986.

'3

''4

`6

POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD

WICK DUFFORD, Lawyer Member

LAWRENCE J.\FAUNK, Chairman

GAYLE ROTHROCK, Vice-Chairman

ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PCHB No. 86-32